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RESPONSE

In Defense of Empirical Legal Studies
CHRISTINA L. BOYD†
INTRODUCTION
The empirical legal studies movement, or ELS, is
positioned to provide an important scholarly impact. As
noted ELS scholar Theodore Eisenberg once put it, “[a]cross
a broad range of legal issues, empirical studies can inform
policymakers and the public. Legally trained social scientists
have unique opportunities to enhance description and
understanding of the legal system.”1 By all accounts, this
influence is well underway. ELS scholarship has been
present in law schools since at least the 1920s2 and is on the
rise in recent years,3 with important empirical insights
gained into legal subjects such as error rates in capital
† Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia (Athens, GA).
Email: cLboyd@uga.edu; URL: cLboyd.net.
1. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1741, 1746 (2004).
2. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
3. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 142 (2006) (arguing that
“ELS recently and dramatically has expanded in law reviews, at conferences, and
among leading law faculties.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Michael Heise, An
Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1739 (2011) (reporting a significant increase in empirical legal
journals from 2000 to 2009, with the 2005 to 2009 period showing a particularly
notable acceleration). Lee Epstein and Gary King would likely argue that this
number is even greater, since, as they note, “a large fraction of legal scholarship
makes at least some claims about the world based on observation or experience.”
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
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punishment convictions,4 civil trial declining rates,5 the
influence of a judge’s sex on individual and collegial decision
making,6 and the influence of the Solicitor General on the
Supreme Court’s decision making,7 just to name a few. These
types of projects all have at least one thing in common: their
systematic, empirical nature permit them to draw
conclusions about legal phenomena in a way that extends
well beyond individual court decisions, personal biases, and
anecdotes.
Notwithstanding this appreciable influence and growth
in legal scholarship, ELS continues to face detractors from
within the legal academy. Most recently, the Buffalo Law
Review published Todd Pettys’s eighty-three page critique8 of
Lee Epstein, Christopher Parker, and Jeffrey Segal’s
unpublished ELS work on the presence of in-group bias in the
First Amendment decision making of U.S. Supreme Court
justices.9 Epstein et al. have already responded to and
addressed Pettys’s specific comments as they relate to their
article, including incorporating a number of robustness
checks into their data and statistical modeling.10 However,

4. See Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of
Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209
(2004).
5. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459
(2004).
6. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the
Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010).
7. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (2012).
8. Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(2015).
9. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment, available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias].
10. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Response to a
Critique
of Our
Study on In-Group
Bias
(Sept.
30,
2014),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasResponse.pdf.
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since Pettys’s critique, and many others like it11—whether
appearing in writing or in other forums like faculty
colloquia—present
significant
tension
with
and
misunderstandings about the core underpinnings of ELS,
this also provides a broader opportunity to respond in defense
of the ELS movement and the principles that distinguish its
work from other legal scholarship.
I. DOING ELS (WELL)
“Empirical /əmˈpirik(ə)l/ adjective. Based on,
concerned with, or verifiable by observation or
experience rather than theory or pure logic.”12
Empirical legal scholarship, as the above definition
suggests, relies on objective observation and/or experience of
some facet of the world.13 The empirical evidence (data)
resulting from this exercise can be quantitative (numerical)
or qualitative (non-numerical),14 and the resulting
conclusions that we draw about the legal world are called
inferences.15 These data and the inferences drawn from them
hold the potential to advance scientific knowledge of the law
and legal actors, something that differs rather significantly
11. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Ownership, 61
FED. COMM. L.J. 651 (2009); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls
of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1924-25 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, The
Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L.
REV. 79 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, Context].
12. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 568 (3d ed. 2010).
13. JANET BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & RICHARD A. JOSLYN, POLITICAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH METHODS 1 (3d ed. 1995).
14. LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 3 (2014). For ease of discussion, many scholars discussing ELS adopt
a more narrow definition that focuses exclusively on statistical studies (i.e.,
quantitative). E.g., Heise, supra note 3, at 1741-42; Craig Allen Nard, Empirical
Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and
Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 349 (1995). For purposes of this
Response, it is not necessary to make this distinction between broader ELS that
includes quantitative and qualitative and more narrow ELS focusing solely on the
former.
15. Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 2. They define an inference as “the process
of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know.” Id. at 29.
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from “knowledge derived from myth, casual observation,
intuition, belief, or common sense.”16 This distinction is
important and is something that I will return to
momentarily.
Of course, not all ELS work is created equally. All ELS
authors have a certain burden to meet in their empirical
studies. Empirical scholarship that is not reliable—as
measured through a variety of metrics—is no more likely to
advance scientific knowledge than myths, common sense, or
casual observation. Luckily, the metrics that help ensure
good ELS work (and avoid pitfalls) have been carefully
catalogued in recent scholarship and include things like
utilizing measures that are both reliable and valid,
accounting for alternative hypotheses, avoiding selection
bias, documenting the data-generation process, and
producing replicable results, just to name a few.17
Conducting quality ELS work that fulfills the above
noted rules is unquestionably an onerous task. In his 1984
piece on empiricism in legal studies, David Trubek focused
on two notable aspects to this exercise, both of which
highlight the tension between ELS and non-ELS scholarship
and thus are very relevant for the current discussion:
The first challenge is getting the right facts: We always must decide
whether something we know about social life is central and
representative or is merely peripheral and unusual. We must also
separate what the observer wants to believe (bias) from the real
facts. A second challenge is to set forth knowledge of the facts
sparingly; we must reduce the information we receive about
empirical reality to a comprehensible and testable set of
propositions.18

Trubek’s two points dispense “best practices” for ELS
scholars. At the same time, they also provide insight into why
(well-conducted) ELS work can hold a monopoly in providing
certain systematic, scientific details about the legal world,
and they highlight the tension that exists between ELS and
16. BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 19.
17. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 47-49; JOHN MONAHAN &
LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53-65 (8th ed.
2014); Epstein & King, supra note 3.
18. David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 580 (1984).
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non-ELS scholars when it comes to designing and carrying
out ELS work. To see why this might be the case, further
exploration of Trubek’s two ELS challenges is merited.
The first is to avoid personal bias in scholarship. This is
something that ELS and non-ELS researchers alike must be
wary of. In the ELS world, this is known as selection bias—
i.e., “[a] systematic tendency on the part of the sampling
procedure to exclude one kind of person or another from the
sample.”19 In non-ELS scholarship, many authors are
primarily focused on advancing and persuading others of
their personal view (i.e., bias) on some aspect of the legal
world. Goldsmith and Vermeule put it like this: “Doctrinal,
interpretative, and normative legal scholarship seeks to
persuade, which means that the lawyer’s style is often largely
rhetorical.”20 Inherently, those so inclined to this mode of
scholarship are likely “to note only phenomena that reinforce
their beliefs while ignoring or dismissing those that do not.” 21
Just as with selection bias in ELS work, then, conclusions
yielding from persuasion-based, non-ELS work are almost
assuredly not representative of nor generalizable to the legal
phenomenon of interest. As Ho and Quinn argue,
“Anecdotalism is unlikely to take us far.”22 The point is that,
as noted above, drawing conclusions from biased observation
from sources like casual observation, personal belief or myths
is quite distinct from developing scientific knowledge.23
However, ELS (done well) permits this.
The second of Trubek’s challenges is just as important
and just as likely to be opposed by non-ELS scholars. At the
heart of ELS data collection and measurement is taking
complexities about the legal world and simplifying them
through measurement. No matter how well it is done by ELS
19. DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 335 (4th ed.
2007).
20. Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 155 (2002).
21. BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 20.
22. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, The Role of Theory and Evidence in Media
Regulation and Law: A Response to Baker and a Defense of Empirical Legal
Studies, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 673, 698 (2008).
23. BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 19.
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scholars, the very nature of simplification and abstraction in
data work can be an open invitation for criticism. We have
probably all heard something like this in a law school faculty
colloquium: “When I clerked for Judge X, he never did things
the way you describe in your statistical analysis” or “ELS
work classifies a complex ninety-page opinion in one line of a
spreadsheet. You are missing important nuances about the
law.”24 Abelson makes the more general point that “[c]ritics
are
often
freewheeling
in
their
invention
of
counterexplanations: It could be this, it may be that, it’s
merely such-and-so. Some types of counterexplanations are
so vague as to be untestable—which gives the critic a
substantial debating advantage.”25
In an effort to head off this sort of attack, how do we
simplify the complex well? Epstein and King argue that “[t]he
key is that we abstract the right dimensions for our purposes,
and that we measure enough dimensions of each subject to
capture all the parts that are essential to our research
question.”26 In aid of this, empiricists advise that
measurements be both reliable (i.e., repeatedly reproducible)
and valid (i.e., capture the intended concept).27
Given this discussion, let’s return to Pettys’s response to
the Epstein et al. study. In it, Pettys criticizes the validity of
the authors’ measurement of speaker ideology. He says:
[I]n earlier versions of their paper the authors revealed that they
regarded “racist communication” and “racist behavior” as things
that qualify a speaker for membership in conservative justices’
24. This latter hypothetical criticism closely follows the words of Edwards &
Livermore, supra note 11, at 1925, who note that “These topical or political
measures used to describe cases will necessarily simplify a court’s holding and
reduce what may be a complex and nuanced decision into an often uninformative
binary.”
25. ROBERT P. ABELSON, STATISTICS AS PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT 14 (1995). Ho and
Quinn argue that the critique of their ELS work on communications law is along
these lines: “Baker’s argument effectively reduces to: you’ve missed something,
yet I won’t tell you exactly what it is, because it’s not measurable.” Ho & Quinn,
supra note 22, at 705.
26. Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 81.
27. See, e.g., MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 17, at 61; Epstein & King, supra
note 3.
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ideological in-group. . . . In my own judgment, the authors’ linkage
between racism and conservative justices’ ideological in-group is
quite stunning.28

Does the fact that Pettys, in his “own judgment,” finds
this coding to be “stunning” make it an invalid measure? Of
course not. Instead, we must assess the validity of the
measure—i.e., whether it captures the intended concepts of
the speakers’ ideologies, the justices’ ideologies, and their
intersection—from an objective standpoint.
To do this, we must examine how Epstein et al.
determined whether any speaker is assigned to a justice’s ingroup. As their paper clarifies, membership in an in-group is
determined by whether there is an overlap in (1) the justice’s
ideology, and (2) the speaker’s ideology.29 When both the
speaker and the justice are liberal or both the speaker and
the justice are conservative, the two can be grouped together,
thus making that speaker in the justice’s in-group.30 When
their ideologies do not line up—i.e., when one is liberal and
the other is conservative—then there is no in-group
membership.31
The next piece to this puzzle is to assess how each of
these two key concepts were themselves measured. The first
of these, the ideology of the justice, is measured using the
Segal-Cover scores, a measurement that ranges continuously
from 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal).32 For further
simplification of what constitutes an in-group within the
paper, the Epstein et al. discussion frequently further
informally breaks down this measurement to simply
28. Pettys, supra note 8, at 78-79. It is worth noting that the “racism” language
that Pettys refers to was in an old version of this (still unpublished) Epstein et al.
paper. The updated language refers to pro-life advocates. While Pettys criticism
may depend on the presence of the “racism” description, the response that I detail
below on assessing the validity of this measure does not.
29. See Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 9, at 6-7.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989). As Epstein et al.
note, their results are robust to an alternative specification of ideology known as
the Martin-Quinn score. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 9, at n.14.
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conservative (i.e., all justices ranging in ideology value from
0 to 0.5) and liberal (i.e., all justices ranging in ideology value
from 0.5 to 1).33 The second, the ideology of the speaker, is a
fixed, dichotomous variable measuring whether the speaker
in each observation is liberal (coded as 1) or conservative
(coded as 0) as determined by the subject of their speech.34
In each case, these measures are abstractions from the
complex. Justice Scalia is measured as a conservative justice
and so is Justice Thomas. Their voting behavior on the Court
may be similar but it is not, of course, identical.35 A racist
speaker, a pro-life speaker, and an anti-gay rights speaker
all get classified as conservative speakers. Some might be
radically conservative and others only moderately
conservative, but when we identify their underlying views
and statements regarding legal concepts like the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, each certainly falls to
the right on a left-right spectrum measuring speaker
ideologies. Of note, this measurement is consistent with a
large body of ELS work classifying things and people
dichotomously as either liberal or conservative.36 While some
33. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 9, at 8-14.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Interestingly, the Segal-Cover scores, which are highly regarded measures
of justice ideology coded from pre-confirmation newspaper coverage of nominees’
positions, also code Justices Souter and Stevens as conservative. Segal & Cover,
supra note 32, at 560. Pettys is apparently fine with this, noting that “the SegalCover scores on which the study’s authors relied provide a plausible basis for
carrying out that task.” Pettys, supra note 8, at 81. As Court watchers know, these
justices were anything but conservative during their time on the Court. But this
has not served as an indictment of these scores. Rather, many recognize that most
of the justices’ Segal-Cover scores have been very informative, and those scores
assigned to Souter and Stevens simply represent the media’s missing and/or
inaccurate information about these nominees from the time that the coded
information was published (i.e., before confirmation).
36. See e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 395-97, 401-04; Sue Davis et al., Voting
Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 129, 132
(1993); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). Along the
lines of Pettys, other scholars have criticized this type of measurement for its over
simplification. E.g., Shapiro, Context, supra note 11, at 91) (arguing that “A
binary, liberal-versus-conservative coding system masks all kinds of subtleties:
some cases are more liberal (or more conservative) than others.”).
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information about degrees of conservatism or liberalism gets
lost in these measures, they do validly capture speaker
ideology. Conservative speakers of all varieties will be coded
as conservative speakers, and the diverse set of liberal
speakers, from eco-terrorists, to war protesters, to
affirmative action proponents, will all be coded as liberal
speakers.
As empirical methods advance over time, it may one day
be possible to more precisely measure speakers’ ideologies on
a continuous scale rather than through a dichotomous
measure. After all, it was not that long ago that Segal and
Cover first released their continuous measure of justice
ideology. The introduction of a continuous speaker ideology
variable, should it ever happen, will not likely serve to indict
the Epstein et al. measure but rather will refine our ability
to empirically capture the complex. Ultimately, “[a]ll
measurement schemes are susceptible to the critique of
oversimplification.”37 By assessing measure reliability and
validity, though, scholarship can “set forth knowledge of the
facts sparingly”38 and simplify the complicated in ways that
can hopefully convince even the most ardent of doctrinal and
normative legal scholars of the merits of ELS work.39
II. ELS TODAY
The opportunities for legal scholars to conduct ELS
research are greater today than ever before. Much of this
revolves around data availability and accessibility that
permits scholars to test their theories without having to
collect much or any new data on the subject—a prospect that
37. EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 47.
38. Trubek, supra note 18, at 580.
39. There will always be readers who will not be convinced by the measures
and data used no matter how much due diligence ELS researchers do in
simplifying the complex. Related to Trubek’s first point on bias, these are readers
who know the outcome that they want and simply will not believe any other
outcome. In their mind, the data are always going to have problems, the coding is
never going to represent reality, there will always be exceptions that do not fit
the coding rule, etc. Ultimately, the reason that these readers remain unbelievers
may well have to do with their own biases rather than the merits of the ELS work
at hand.
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undoubtedly served as a barrier of entry for previous wouldbe ELS researchers given the time, expense, and difficulty of
collecting good, original data.40
Table 1 provides a list of many useful ELS databases that
are available online for scholarly use. The list is meant to be
a sample rather than exhaustive—there are surely many
others that are also of equal quality and value.41 Each of these
databases represents a treasure trove of usefulness to
scholars, both past and future.
Data Set

Contents (& Archival Location)

Supreme Court
Database (AKA
“Spaeth Data”)

Coding of each case heard and justice vote recorded
from the 1946-2013 terms of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Updated yearly. (http://scdb.wustl.edu)

U.S. Courts of
Appeals
Database and
Updates (AKA
“Songer Data”)

1925-2002 random sample of published decisions,
with voting coded at the case and individual judge
level. (http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/
juri/appct.htm)

Federal Court
Cases: Integrated
Data Bases

Filing and termination data on federal trial and
appellate court terminated and pending civil and
criminal cases. (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/72)

U.S. Sentencing
Commission Data

Individual offender-level sentences, 2002-2013.
(http://www.ussc.gov/research-andpublications/commission-datafiles)

NBER Patent
Data Project

U.S. Patent data for 1976-2006. (https://sites.
google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home)

EEOC Litigation
Project

Sample of EEOC-brought litigation (e.g., motions,
consent decrees, case events, case outcomes) in the
federal district courts from 1997-2006.
(http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu)

UCLA-LoPucki
Bankruptcy
Research
Database

Updated monthly, these data include approximately
two hundred variables on all bankruptcies filed by
large, public companies.
(http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu)

40. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 3, at 1747.
41. The list contents likely over represent databases produced by political
scientists, something that surely reflects my training and research.
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Election results from U.S. state courts of last resort
Judicial Elections from 1990 to 2010, with more limited data available
Data Initiative:
on intermediate appellate courts and general
U.S. State Courts
jurisdiction trial courts.
(http://jedi.wustl.edu/data.php)
State Supreme
Court Data
Project

Data on state supreme court decisions for 19951998 organized at both the court level and the
justice level. (http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/
statecourt/index.html)

Judicial Elections
Data Initiative:
Bolivia Dataset

2011 Bolivia judicial election results.
(http://jedi.wustl.edu/data-bolivia-dataset.php)

Judicial Common
Space Scores

Ideology scores for Federal Article III judges and
justices. (http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
JCS.html) & (http://cLboyd.net/ideology)

Segal-Cover
Scores

Perceived ideology and qualifications scores for U.S.
Supreme Court justices, 1937-2012.
(http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/
polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf)

Martin-Quinn
Scores

Ideology scores for U.S. Supreme Court justices,
1937-2013. (http://mqscores.berkeley.edu)

International
Criminal
Tribunals
Database

Individual trial data on International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
(http://www.psci.unt.edu/~meernik/International%2
0Criminal%20Tribunals%20Website.htm)

Lower Federal
Court
Confirmation
Database

Lower federal court judicial nominations data,
1977-2004. (http://cdp.binghamton.edu/lfccd.htm)

The U.S.
Supreme Court
Amicus Curiae
Database

1946-2001 term amicus curiae briefs filed in U.S.
Supreme Court orally argued cases.
(http://www.psci.unt.edu/~pmcollins/data.htm)

High Courts
Judicial
Database

Coded decisions from national high courts in
Australia, Canada, India, Namibia, Philippines,
South Africa, Tanzania, United Kingdom, United
States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
(http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/highcts.htm)
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Supreme Court Citation metrics from majority opinions in the U.S.
Citation Network
Reports from 1754 to 2002.
Data
(http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/judicial.htm)
Biographical
Directory of
Federal Judges

Confirmation and background variables on all
Federal Article III judges and justices, 1789 to
present. (http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/judges.html)

The Supreme
Court Opinion
Writing Database

Data on U.S. Supreme Court justices’ internal
memos and opinion drafts circulated during the
Burger Court.
(http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu)

Empirical Study
of Religious
Liberty Decisions
Study Data

Establishment and Free Exercise Clause lower
federal court cases, 1986-2005.
(http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/
gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html)

Table 1: Selected ELS Data Available Online

Additional comment on one of these databases, the
Supreme Court Database, is warranted—both because of its
remarkable scope and modern accessibility, and because it is
the subject of attack in Pettys’s recent work appearing in the
pages of the Buffalo Law Review.42 Harold Spaeth’s Supreme
Court Database began in the 1980s43 and has been available
for download online for years. Only recently, however, have
the data been fully accessible to a broad range of interested
parties, including non-empirical scholars and laypeople via
the web form linked above in Table 1.44 The coding rules are
documented in great detail online, thereby satisfying the

42. Pettys, supra note 8.
43. Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data
Base: Providing New Insights into the Court, 83 JUDICATURE 228, 228 (2000).
44. Because of its accessibility to non-empiricists, I use the data in an
undergraduate course on the Supreme Court. The same could easily be done in a
law school class. Most of the students in my classes have little to no empirical
research experience, but with the database, these students are easily able to
analyze a range of research questions on the Court—from “how often do justices
write dissents?” to “how does Justice Ginsburg vote in taxation cases?” to “how
has the Court’s treatment of the U.S. as a petitioner changed over time?”
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ELS call for data to have well-defined coding schemes and
utilize codebooks.45
In political science alone, the reliance on the Supreme
Court Database for empirical projects on the Court has been
significant. Benesh notes that between 1991-2000, nearly
eighty-five percent of the empirical, data-driven studies on
the Supreme Court appearing in the top two political science
journals utilized the Supreme Court database. 46 These
numbers are surely higher today, particularly when one
includes law journals in the calculation of database use.
Despite its popularity of use in scholarship, a handful of
recent studies have criticized the Supreme Court database.
For example, Shapiro debates the database’s coding of the
“issue” variable. Within the database, “A case’s issue
characterizes it from a public policy standpoint based on the
Court’s own statements of what the case is about.”47 The
“decision direction” variable (e.g., conservative or liberal or
unidentified) is then coded within the baseline of the coded
issue. The essence of Shapiro’s argument is that rather than
identifying a singular “issue” based on public policy
considerations, a preferable coding scheme would be to
identify the series of “subissues” in a case and then code
“decision direction” for each.48 When this is done, she says,
many cases ultimately have “mixed” overall decision
directions rather than “liberal” or “conservative.”49 There is
nothing wrong with Shapiro’s more nuanced approach,
assuming coders can objectively and consistently carry it
out,50 but it is capturing something distinct from Spaeth’s

45. EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 97-112.
46. Sara C. Benesh, Harold J. Spaeth: The Supreme Court Computer, in THE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 116, 131 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2006).
47. Spaeth & Segal, supra note 43, at 233.
48. Shapiro, Context, supra note 11, at 98-102.
49. See id.
50. Shapiro also admits that “the more nuanced and detailed a coding regime
for case law, the more likely it is to involve subjective determinations.” Carolyn
Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the
Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 528 (2009).
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“issue” variable.51 While Pettys refers to debates like these as
“problems that reportedly trouble the database” 52 and bases
a number of pages of his discussion of the Epstein et al. piece
on the topic, his and/or Shapiro’s opinions on the level of
analysis that the “issue” and “decision direction” variables
should be coded compared to what Spaeth does in the data
amount to something far from incendiary.
None of this is to say that the Supreme Court Database,
like all data created by others, does not have its limitations.
It does. However, because the data include citations to the
source opinions, the data can be fully coded and recoded by
those interested in applying their own rules or adapting the
data in alternative ways. Indeed, Spaeth, the database’s
original architect, “has always had as a major goal that other
scholars be able to replicate any of the work he has done or,
indeed, change the coding as they see fit.”53 As such,
responsible and careful researchers should be well positioned
to intelligently use the data.
In addition to the large number of publicly available ELS
datasets like the Supreme Court database and the others
listed in Table 1, it is often also more feasible today than in
the past for ELS scholars to collect their own original data.
For example, in my own empirical research area, federal
district courts, I can electronically collect and code docket
sheets, complaints, motions, orders, and opinions for cases in
all ninety-four courts in my samples of interest.54 Just ten or
fifteen years ago, such a research design would require trips
to many courthouses or archival facilities and a lot of
quarters for making copies.
51. The Supreme Court database separately captures the legal provision(s) in
a case, with multiple per case frequently coded. Relevant to Shapiro, though,
“decision direction” is not coded based on these legal provisions. See, e.g., Spaeth
& Segal, supra note 43, at 233.
52. Pettys, supra note 8, at 75.
53. Benesh, supra note 46, at 138.
54. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic, & Kosta
Ristovski, Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in
Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPERICAL LEGAL STUD. 253 (2013); Christina L. Boyd
& David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853 (2010);
Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It?, 1 J. LAW & COURTS 193 (2013).
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CONCLUSION
This piece begins and ends on the same note: ELS
scholarship holds great potential for influencing the legal
world. Empirical methods are not the only way to study and
research the law, but they do provide an invaluable way.
“Empirical scholarship speaks directly to those who are most
profoundly involved in our legal institutions, by furnishing
the profession with a compass in our sometimes foggy legal
waters.”55
But the onus is on ELS scholars to convince others—from
non-ELS colleagues, to judges, to policy makers, and
beyond—to pay heed to our research. This can be aided by
following good practices in the design and implementation of
our ELS work,56 effectively communicating our empirical
results to non-ELS audiences,57 having conversations with
our colleagues about ELS’ quests for things like inferences
and scientific knowledge, and patiently explaining to those
colleagues how ELS measurement often rests on the art of
simplifying the complex. We can also help our cause by
taking opportunities to coauthor with others who hold
complementary legal or social science expertise to us and
even training judges, our students, and ourselves how to use,
interpret, and appreciate data.58 As Clermont and Eisenberg
once put it so eloquently, “[d]ata are good”59 and so is ELS.

55. Nard, supra note 14, at 349.
56. See supra Part II.
57. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Christina L. Boyd, On the
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 801 (2007); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On
the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 1811 (2006).
58. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 14.
59. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 154 (2002).

